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ABSTRACT 
In European development policy circles, China’s Africa policy has spurred a lively 
debate about the motives, instruments and effects thereof. The paper assesses the 
‘competitive pressure’ that China’s growing presence in Africa exerts on the European 
development policy regime, and on European development policy to Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia is one of the most important countries in Chinese, as well as European, 
cooperation with Africa. For the EU, Ethiopia is the largest aid recipient in Africa. For 
China, in contrast, Ethiopia is not primarily an aid recipient but an important 
economic and political ally in its new Africa policy. The paper argues that Chinese 
financial flows to Ethiopia are largely complementary to European aid, providing the 
Ethiopian government with resources much needed to implement its ambitious 
development strategy. However, China has emerged also as an alternative partner to 
the Ethiopian government, providing alternative development templates and an 
alternative approach to discuss about economic and political reforms. Chinese 
engagement in Ethiopia thereby sheds light on the gap between European rhetoric and 
policy practice, pressuring the EU to make more efforts to reform its development 
policy system. 
Keywords: China in Africa; EU-Africa relations; Ethiopia; European development 
policy 
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CCS discussion papers should contribute to the academic debate on China’s global 
rise and the consequences thereof for African development. We do therefore 
explicitly invite scholars from Africa, China, or elsewhere, to use this format for 
advanced papers that are ready for an initial publication, not least to obtain input 
from other colleagues in the field. Discussion papers should thus be seen as work in 
progress, exposed to (and ideally stimulating) policy-relevant discussion based on 
academic standards. 
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PREFACE 
This discussion paper by CCS affiliate Christine Hackenesch is somewhat unusual in 
perspective for African readers. It is consciously looking at challenges emerging from 
China‟s rise in Africa for cooperation from a European perspective.  
While there is debate in Africa on the opportunities and risks this Chinese engagement 
provides, external partners of Africa are asking the same question: what does the Chinese 
engagement mean for our cooperation policy with African countries. The perspective is 
important and instructive to Africans, as Europe is and remains the largest partner to 
African countries, despite its current crisis. The combined weight of EU member 
countries in African countries might be shrinking in relative terms in trade, aid and with 
regard to investment; it still is, however, very substantial and it would be throwing the 
baby out with the bathwater if one simply brushes the EU contribution aside. This 
discussion paper, therefore, informs readers about a European debate of relevance to 
Africans. 
 
 Sven Grimm, 
 Director, Centre for Chinese Studies  
 
Stellenbosch, November 2011 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of new powerful actors rapidly and substantially transforms the context 
in which development is to occur in Africa. China – deliberately or not – changes the 
context in which the European Union (EU) engages with developing countries, making it 
one of the biggest external challenges to European development policy in Africa (Grimm 
/ Hackenesch 2012). Emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil are not part of 
the traditional aid system and do not apply standards developed within the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to their cooperation with African states. 
Their largest impact on development opportunities in Africa does not stem from their 
development aid but from other official flows, trade and investments. Among the 
emerging economies, Chinese engagement in Africa is by far the most substantial. With 
aid to Africa estimated at USD 2.5 billion in 2009, China is a donor comparable to 
Germany but substantially smaller than France or the European Commission (EC) 
(Bräutigam 2009). In contrast, other official flows such as preferential and commercial 
credits have been estimated at USD 6 billion in 2009 compared to about USD 1 billion 
provided by the EU as a whole (Craig-McQuaide et al 2011). China‟s trade with Africa 
has surpassed USD 100 billion in 2010 (after a slight dip during the economic crisis), 
making China the third largest trading partner after the EU as a whole and the US. China 
is now also the fifth largest investor in Africa with FDI stocks reaching USD 7.8 billion 
at the end of 2008 (UNCTAD 2010). 
In European development policy circles China‟s Africa policy has spurred a lively debate 
about the motives, instruments and effects thereof. The increase of Chinese engagement 
in Africa coincides with European and other traditional donors‟ efforts to making 
development policy more effective and (re-)establishing the legitimacy of development 
assistance. Some critics argue that China‟s policy is challenging the OECD consensus on 
conditions and standards attached to development policy, since China does not apply 
internationally agreed commitments while providing aid (Manning 2006; Gabas 2009). 
Others see China‟s policies more positively as catalysers of overdue change in European 
postcolonial and charity-based attitudes, triggering a debate of what development is and 
the best ways of achieving it. In this sense, China has become “a factor and accelerator in 
European considerations about reorienting the EU-Africa Partnership”, and although 
China has not triggered this debate it “gave it new impetus” (Berger / Wissenbach 2007, 
4). 
Against this background, the paper assesses the „competitive pressure‟ (Woods 2008) that 
Chinese growing presence in Africa exerts on the European development policy regime 
(section II) and on European development policy to Ethiopia in particular (section III). 
While this competitive pressure has been felt at the level of the European aid regime for a 
couple of years already, at the level of individual African countries interaction between 
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China and the EU is still recent. Ethiopia is a particularly interesting case because it is one 
of the most important countries in Chinese as well as European cooperation with Africa. 
At the same time, differences in Chinese and European approaches to engage with 
African states are particularly evident in Ethiopia. For the EU as a whole (EC and EU 
member states), Ethiopia is the largest aid recipient in Africa (EU donor atlas 2010). Aid 
is the major instrument in European cooperation with Ethiopia and Ethiopia constitutes 
one of the key countries in reforming the European aid system. For China, in contrast, 
Ethiopia is not primarily an aid recipient but an important economic and political ally in 
its new Africa policy. Contrary to widespread assumptions that China primarily engages 
in resource rich countries, Ethiopia has become one of the largest recipients of Chinese 
official flows. The paper argues that Chinese financial flows to Ethiopia are largely 
complementary to European aid, providing the Ethiopian government with resources 
much needed to implement its ambitious development strategy. However, China has 
emerged also as an alternative partner to the Ethiopian government, providing alternative 
development templates and an alternative approach to discuss about economic and 
political reforms. Chinese engagement in Ethiopia thereby sheds light on the gap between 
European rhetoric about reforms and policy practice, pressuring the EU to make more 
efforts to remain an attractive partner. 
 
 
2. THE EU AND CHINA IN AFRICA 
2.1. THE EU: FROM DONOR-RECIPIENT TO MODERN PARTNERSHIP 
Despite reform efforts in recent years to improve the coherence between different policy 
fields, e.g. in the Lisbon Treaty and in the context of the EU-Africa joint strategic 
partnership, European policy making towards African countries remains fragmented. 
Foreign and security policy, trade and development policy still constitute separate policy 
fields with different actors, interests and decision-making structures involved. In 
European external relations development policy emerged as a separate policy field with 
shared competences between the European Commission and EU member states. Official 
development assistance to African countries is provided through the European 
Development Fund (EDF), managed by the European Commission, as well as through 
bilateral channels via EU member states. With a distinct development commissioner at 
the EU level and separate ministries in some EU member states, development policy 
enjoys a relatively high degree of autonomy (Olsen 2005), although this has been 
questioned with the establishment of the European External Action Service (Furness 
2010). At the same time, with development bureaucracies and NGOs as the main 
constituencies, development policy has been characterised as a „weak‟ policy field 
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compared to trade or agriculture policy for instance with well organised and powerful 
interest groups (Carbone 2008).1 
While development assistance is one of the key instruments in European cooperation 
with many African countries, European development policy has been under reform 
pressure for more than a decade. Pressure for reform cannot be attributed to the EU only 
but are part of broader demands for reforming development policy since the early 1990s. 
European donors have widely endorsed the new international aid agenda that emerged in 
the early 2000s. In light of a general legitimacy crisis in the 1990s suffered by European 
and Western development assistance more broadly, donors proposed a set of reforms to 
recast aid relationships as a „new partnership‟ between donors and recipients (Fraser / 
Whitfield 2009). In brief, traditional donors committed to provide more assistance;  to 
reduce the fragmentation of aid delivery with a view to supporting developing countries‟ 
development strategies. And they committed to strengthen coherence between 
development assistance and other policies that impact on developing countries (Ashoff 
2010). The new aid agenda asked for a readjustment of traditional donors‟ „motives‟ in 
providing assistance. After the end of the cold war and in light of decreasing economic 
interests in African countries, European donors rejected the strategic orientation of 
assistance and self-interested motives in the commercial tying of aid. In exchange for 
their reforms, European and other traditional donors expected recipient countries to 
commit to poverty reduction and to improving their governance systems (Fraser / 
Whitfield 2009). 
European development policy is at a critical stage in this reform process (Maxwell, Engel 
et al 2003; Grimm 2008; Orbie 2012). Policy papers and institutional reforms, not least 
under the Lisbon treaty, provide the basis for the EU to become a more effective actor in 
development. Yet, many of the commitments have not been met. Tight public budgets in 
light of the economic crisis question the ability of the EU to meet the 0.7 target, some 
donors instead even reduce their aid budgets. Despite efforts to improve the 
coordination of European donors, e.g. through joint multi-annual programming and the 
introduction of a Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in 2007, the European donor 
system remains strongly fragmented. Key challenges also concern the relation between 
development policy and other policy fields. Although policy coherence for development 
was taken up in European policy debates already in the 1990s, the implementation of the 
principle made limited progress (Carbone 2008). 
Reforms in European development policy transform relations with African countries. 
Some observers maintain that these changes come with several paradoxes and new 
practices often have been layered on top of rather than replaced the old regime (Fraser / 
                                                             
1 In case of economic crisis – as could be observed recently – this constituency is struggling to make the 
case for development spending and „defend‟ development assistance against requests from other interests 
groups 
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Whitfield 2009). Particularly the emphasis on governance reforms and the conditioning of 
assistance to governance reforms has been criticised for marking a fundamental shift in 
donor-recipient relations (Moore 1995). While donors on the one hand appear to be 
more reluctant to impose their reform templates on recipient countries and question the 
ability of external actors to „drive‟ political and economic change in developing countries, 
more accountable governance is at the same time not only seen as an objective of 
development processes but also as a precondition for delivering effective development 
assistance. Some criticise that with the emphasis on governance reforms, the traditional 
understanding of sovereignty gave way to a modified view on sovereignty according to 
which not every form of political system regardless of its organisation is seen as valuable 
and worth preserving (Dolzer 2004; Herdegen 2007). 
 
2.2.  CHINA: THE CHALLENGE OF FORGING MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL  
RELATIONS 
China has not been part of recent reforms in the international aid system as a donor. 
Chinese norms, principles and instruments for cooperating with African countries are 
instead largely influenced by China‟s traditional foreign policy principles, China‟s own 
development experiences and its economic and political interests in cooperating with 
African countries.  
Aid has played an important role in the recent transformation of China‟s Africa policy. 
Yet, the function of aid as an instrument in Chinese external relations is changing rapidly. 
Reforms in China‟s aid system in the 1990s provided the basis to closely link aid to trade, 
investments and other official flows with a view to strengthening economic cooperation 
between China and African countries (Bräutigam 2009; Zhou 2012). As Chinese trade, 
FDI and other official flows to African countries have been low until the beginning of 
the new century, aid constituted the key ingredient in Chinese economic cooperation with 
many African countries. Since then, Chinese cooperation with African countries has been 
intensifying and broadening rapidly. In this regard, the 2006 Forum for China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) meeting in Beijing was a prominent indication for Africans and 
Europeans that China proposes a partnership to African countries that goes beyond aid, 
consisting instead of a comprehensive package of trading opportunities, soft loans for 
infrastructure projects, direct investments as well as technical assistance and training 
programmes.2 During the 2009 FOCAC meeting in Sharm el Sheik the policy fields for 
cooperation have been further expanded to include new areas as climate change or 
science and technology. 3  Within this evermore comprehensive cooperation, aid is 
                                                             
2 The policy fields for cooperation are laid out in the FOCAC action plan, 
http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dscbzjhy/DOC32009/t280369.htm, last access June 2011.  
3 During the 2009 FOCAC meeting a new action plan has been has been proposed: 
http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dsjbzjhy/hywj/, last access June 2011. 
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increasingly singled out as a separate instrument. The recently published „White Paper on 
Chinese Aid to Foreign Countries‟ (State Council 2011) provides a clearer definition of 
what aid is, how and to which countries it should be provided. Some of these 
clarifications indicate how current debates in China are increasingly influenced also by 
discussions in the traditional OECD DAC system and by criticism brought forward in 
Western media and policy debates against China‟s Africa policy. 
Chinese engagement in Africa differs from European donors with regard to the identity 
and norms that China projects in cooperating with African countries. The Chinese 
government has projected an identity of China being a „post-colonial‟ actor, presenting 
China‟s approach to cooperating with African countries and China‟s views on 
development as an alternative to traditional donors. China portrays itself as the „largest 
developing country‟, being close to African needs and colonial experiences due to its own 
history and recent development (cf. King 2006). Even though the Chinese government is 
clearly not a monolithic actor and different state actors have different interests in Sino-
African relations (Reilly / Na 2007), it still communicates a very consistent set of norms 
and principles in relations with African states and a perspective that is highly welcomed in 
countries that have for long time been treated as „junior partners‟ in international 
relations. With China‟s growing international economic weight, however, this discourse is 
more and more difficult to sustain. The challenge of constructing a new identity that 
reconciles China‟s position as an emerging power, as an aid recipient and aid provider 
underpins not least the new White Paper on Foreign Aid (State Council 2011). 
In line with its general foreign policy principles, the Chinese government‟s discourse 
affirms Westphalian norms of state sovereignty, highlighting the principle of non-
interference and rejecting the conditioning of assistance to economic or political reforms 
in African countries (cf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004; Zhao 2004). The Chinese 
government does not condition its projects to broader economic or political reforms in 
African countries. Chinese cooperation with African countries does not involve broader 
debates on African development strategies. Exchange on Chinese development 
experiences takes place – but primarily when African governments ask for it. In 
negotiations on concrete projects, particularly in cases where these projects shall bring 
immediate economic benefits and are not part of „resources for infrastructure‟ deals, the 
government may ask African governments to explain how projects fit within the 
development of that policy field.4 
Instead of putting poverty reduction as the core objective and development aid as the key 
instrument for cooperation, the Chinese government proposes a comprehensive package 
of economic cooperation that shall be beneficial for both sides (“win-win cooperation”). 
However, China has not established a distinct „development policy‟ towards African 
countries or a clear strategy, how the objective of mutually beneficial relations shall be 
                                                             
4 Interviews in Beijing July 2010 and Ethiopia November 2010. 
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put into practice. The realization of mutually beneficial relations instead relies strongly on 
the rapid growth and intensification that Sino-African relations have experienced, driven 
to a large extent by the domestic economic development in China. With the 
intensification in bilateral relations, also power asymmetries in the relation are growing 
rapidly (sometimes not unlike traditional patterns between Western donors and African 
countries) and expectations on the African side towards the relationship are rising 
(Wissenbach 2009). 
Chinese cooperation with African countries further differs with regard to the types of 
actors involved in bilateral relations. In contrast to the EU, no development policy 
community has been emerging in China. The provision of Chinese assistance to African 
countries involves the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Ministry of Finance and several line ministries (Zhou 2012). Even though state actors still 
dominate Chinese relations with African countries, a broader range of state actors is now 
engaged in providing Chinese assistance and in economic and political cooperation 
beyond aid (Reilly / Na 2007; Alden 2007). With rapidly growing interdependence and 
diversification of Chinese actors, the need to build up capacities of various actors, to 
create mechanisms for coordination among actors and to build up institutions for 
cooperation with African countries increases. In addition, Chinese, African and 
international actors increasingly demand Chinese government institutions to actively 
„manage‟ growing interdependencies. International and African civil society organisations, 
for instance, are asking for better regulating Chinese companies that are active in mining 
or large scale infrastructure projects. However, also demands from Chinese companies 
for support in difficult security or business environments are growing.5 The fact that 
China does not have a separate development policy community on the one hand may 
make it easier for China to develop a coherent policy towards African countries. On the 
other hand, there is no specific community in China putting pressure on the policy-
making process to assure that this policy takes developmental effects into account. 
 
2.3. CHINA IN AFRICA: A CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT 
POLICY? 
By offering an alternative approach to cooperation, important amounts of development 
finance and alternative development templates, Chinese engagement in Africa exerts 
considerable „competitive pressure‟ (Woods 2008) on the European aid regime. China‟s 
own development path and divergences in Chinese and European norms, principles and 
instruments in cooperating with African countries challenge some fundamental 
assumptions in the European development policy community on how development 
works, how aid should be provided and how aid contributes to development. 
                                                             
5 Interviews in Beijing July 2010, March 2011 
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Uncertainties and controversies about these issues have existed regardless of Chinese 
engagement in Africa. Yet, Chinese presence puts some of the contradictions inherent in 
the aid system on the spotlight, shedding also light on the gap between European donors‟ 
commitments to improving the effectiveness of aid and the reality of implementing 
reforms. 
Chinese approach to cooperating with African countries with „no strings‟ and 
conditionalities attached seems to offer an alternative to European requests for 
comprehensive political and policy dialogues and commitments to governance reforms. 
While the analysis of Chinese and European concrete policies towards individual 
countries needs to clarify to what extent their approaches to cooperation differ in 
practice, their rhetoric clearly diverges. European donors on their part struggle to 
reconcile their objective of promoting governance reforms with the renewed emphasis on 
country-led reform processes as it emerged under the new aid paradigm. Compared to 
the EU, Chinese rhetoric appears not only more consistent but also more convergent 
with many African elites‟ preferences. In addition, China‟s strong economic performance 
and relative stability without democratisation challenges the attractiveness of a European 
development model as a template for reforms in African countries, even more so in times 
of economic crisis in Europe. Chinese economic success is thereby fuelling debates in 
European donor circles about the link between democratic reforms and economic growth 
in transition countries.    
Chinese emphasis that cooperation with African countries should be based on mutual 
benefits and yield „win-win‟ results contrasts with widespread convictions in European 
development policy circles that aid should not serve donor interests in the first place. 
While political reality has never matched donor rhetoric, this paradigm has been further 
put under pressure in recent years in light of tight European public budgets, government 
changes in some EU member states such as Germany, and growing debates about 
transforming development assistance towards a „global public policy‟ (Severino / Ray 
2009). In this regard the close linkages between Chinese aid, other official flows, trade 
and investments ties in with recent discussions in European development policy circles 
about reaching out to the private sector and better linking development aid with other 
forms of development finance. While China‟s presence has clearly not caused these 
debates, it has given them more impetus. 
As Chinese official flows are mostly provided in the form of tied projects and official 
flows are not channelled through African budgets, some have argued that Chinese 
financial flows may contribute to enhance the proliferation and fragmentation of aid, 
putting pressure on African bureaucracies and decreasing transparency. Some have called 
on China and other emerging economies to more closely integrate the traditional aid 
system and to adopt key standards that emerged within the traditional aid system 
(Manning 2006). However, even within the European Union where institutional 
structures and framework agreements that should allow for implementing the aid 
13 
 
effectiveness agenda are well developed by now, the implementation of reforms remains 
difficult. In light of limited progress made by traditional donors, incentives for China to 
join the traditional aid system are arguably highly limited (Woods 2008). 
In reaction to growing Sino-African ties, the European Commission and some EU 
member states have sought to pro-actively engage in trilateral dialogue and cooperation 
with China and African countries (Hackenesch 2009). Indeed, the ability of the EU to 
formulate a pro-active response and engage with China in Africa has sometimes been 
framed as a „test case‟ for the EU‟s strategy to promote global development through 
effective multilateralism (Wissenbach 2009). Yet, different attempts to forge trilateral 
dialogue have remained on the level of policy formulation and strongly bilateral in its 
engagement with China rather than with China and African states or regional 
organisations. In contrast, concrete cooperation projects with China and African 
countries have rarely materialised (Grimm / Hackenesch 2012). European reactions to 
Chinese increasing activities in Africa thereby illustrate the complexity of European 
development policy-making and the difficulty of European donors to reach out to third 
actors beyond the development policy community. The growing presence of a variety of 
Chinese state (and non-state) actors as investors and traders in African countries requires 
European donors to identify relevant partners for cooperation and to find new channels 
and instruments for communication. Since no development policy community exists in 
China, European donors are thereby lacking „natural partners‟ on the Chinese side.  
14 
 
 
3. THE EU AND CHINA IN ETHIOPIA: COMPETING 
DEVELOPMENT ACTORS? 
Beyond the policy level, European donors are increasingly confronted with 
Chinese presence in African states. While the size of Chinese economic 
cooperation varies considerably across countries, Ethiopia is one of the cases 
where European donors and China emerge as two equally important partners for 
the government. Chinese engagement thereby increases the leverage of the 
Ethiopian government vis-à-vis European and other traditional donors. For the 
time being, European donors have felt little direct competitive pressure from 
China in Ethiopia, not least because the Ethiopian government has engaged 
traditional donors and emerging economies such as China strongly on a bilateral 
basis.6 With China‟s growing presence in Ethiopia this is likely to change quickly.  
 
3.1. THE EU: A FRAGMENTED DONOR SYSTEM IN REFORM 
Development assistance is one of the key instruments in European cooperation with 
Ethiopia. EU member states provide assistance bilaterally and multilaterally through the 
European development fund and the EU budget. Ethiopia is the largest recipient of 
European aid in Africa and is also worldwide among the largest recipients of European 
aid.7 For Ethiopia, the EU as a whole (European Commission and EU member states) 
has been the largest traditional donor in 2009, providing about 40 percent of total aid or 
about € 1 billion.8 Ethiopia is eligible for assistance from the European investment facility 
as well, but receives de facto rather small credit lines.9 European countries do not provide 
other official financial flows such as loans or export credits that go beyond official 
development assistance.10 
Despite the EU being the largest donor in terms of aid volume, it is clearly no single and 
coherent actor. In contrast, the European donor system in Ethiopia is highly fragmented, 
                                                             
6 Interviews in Addis October 2009, November 2010 
7 In 2007, Ethiopia has been the fourth largest recipient of European aid (European Commission and EU 
member states combined) after Iraq (about €3.2 billion), Turkey (€1.2 billion) and Afghanistan (€1 billion) 
(European Donor Atlas 2010). 
8 Apart from the EU, the World Bank and the United States are the largest donors to Ethiopia. The US is 
the largest bilateral donor to Ethiopia and has provided about USD1bn assistance annually between 2007 
and 2010. Yet, about USD300 million of this assistance is provided in food aid. 
9 Loans from the European Investment Bank amounted to about € 150 million between 2000 and 2011, 
http://www.eib.org/projects/loans/regions/acp/et.htm?start=2000&end=2011&sector=, last access June 
2011. 
10 For figures European assistance and other official flows to Ethiopia refer to OECD DAC statistics. 
15 
 
involving a wide range of public and private actors. Ethiopia receives assistance from 20 
European member states and the European Commission, even though aid volumes 
diverge greatly among European donors. 11 The bulk of assistance is provided by ten 
European donors, with the UK and the EC accounting for the largest share. Other 
member states – e.g. from Eastern and Southern Europe – provide fairly small volumes 
of assistance. Some European donors‟ assistance has been fluctuating substantially over 
the last years. Italy for instance, halved its aid since 2005, whereas the UK quadrupled 
assistance in the same period and announced that it will further increase assistance until 
2015.12 To give a full picture of European assistance to Ethiopia, it is important to also 
mention the role of European NGOs that are very active in Ethiopia; some of them 
closely engaging with European donor agencies and implementing official assistance 
programmes (e.g. Oxfam UK), others relying on private fund raising. European 
assistance is spread across a broad range of policy fields, ranging from support for 
infrastructure and agriculture to social sectors. Some donors such as the UK or Nordic 
countries strongly focus their assistance on social sectors and support for governance 
reforms. The EC supports the transport sector as one of its focal areas. 
High levels of European aid and the presence of many European donors can be 
explained by various factors. Whereas Ethiopia historically received low levels of aid 
compared to other African countries,13 Ethiopia became a natural partner for European 
donors with the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) Agenda and the new 
international consensus on development aid. Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in 
the world with the second largest population in sub-Saharan Africa, half of it Muslim. 
The Ethiopian government is perceived by donors as being strongly committed to 
development and as one of those countries with the clearest „ownership‟ of its 
development strategy. In this regard, the Ethiopian elite is seen to be motivated by the 
desire to implement its development vision rather than by personal financial gains. Most 
donors also commend Ethiopia‟s bureaucratic capacities to implement assistance 
programmes quickly, once donors and the government have reached agreement (Furtado 
/ Smith 2009; interviews in Addis November 2010). As one observer points out:  
“Indeed, one regularly hears EU diplomats saying something like: „If things do not 
succeed in Ethiopia [political reform, democratization, state stability, economic growth, 
                                                             
11 The analysis is based on OECD DAC statistics about aid from EU member states and the European 
Commission to Ethiopia, http://stats.oecd.org/, last access June 2011. 
12 The UK has just announced that it will increase its assistance to Ethiopia to USD533 million by 2015 
which would make Ethiopia the largest recipient of British aid. 
13 Low levels of aid can partly be explained because Ethiopia has not been colonised and did not receive 
„special‟ support by a former colonial power. During the cold war, Ethiopia was perceived to be „on the 
wrong side‟ and was not supported for strategic reasons. Aid increased at the beginning of the 1990s. 
During the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea donors reduced financial assistance again and provided 
mainly humanitarian aid (Furtado / Smith 2009). 
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realization of at least a good number of MDCs, JA], then it will not work anywhere.‟ The 
perception is that they must be a success and be supported, however cautiously…” 
(Abbink 2009; emphasis in the original).  
Prime Minister Meles‟ active engagement in the international aid effectiveness agenda 
may have further contributed to European donors‟ willingness to provide support. Meles 
has taken an active role for instance in Tony Blair‟s Commission for Africa, the G8 
Gleneagles meeting in 2005 during which donors decided to increase aid by 0.51 percent 
of GNI by 2010 and more recently in the climate change negotiations and the G20 
meetings. 
High levels of assistance in contrast can hardly be attributed to European economic 
interests in Ethiopia. Beyond development assistance, EU-Ethiopia economic 
cooperation is limited. For the EU trade with Ethiopia is marginal, also compared to 
trade flows with other African countries. In 2009, the EU was the largest export market 
for Ethiopian products and the second largest source of imports after China (European 
Commission 2011). Ethiopia exports mainly primary goods to Europe, a large share of it 
coffee to Germany. Although the „Everything but Arms‟ initiative provides Ethiopia duty 
and quota free access to European markets since 2001, trade flows increased only 
marginally after the introduction of this regime. Direct investments from European 
private companies in Ethiopia are tiny at best. German companies for instance have 
made only small investments, mainly in the leather and flower industry. 14  In 2010, 
Ethiopia was ranked on position 104 out of 183 countries in the World Bank‟s doing 
business report. This places Ethiopia among the top 10 African countries. Yet, Ethiopia 
is still considered by European companies as a highly difficult environment for doing 
business.15 
 
REFORMING A COMPLEX SYSTEM 
Whereas European donors have made efforts to improve the aid management and the 
coherence of European assistance to Ethiopia, much remains to be done (Carlsson et al 
2009). The EC and most EU member states increasingly work through multi-donor 
programmes and support sector wide approaches, although strong differences between 
donors and across sectors exist. While the EC for instance channels the bulk of its 
assistance through joint implementation structures, some member states such as Italy or 
France still provide most of their aid through projects. In 2007, the EC and key member 
states agreed on a joint response strategy that promotes joint implementation structures 
and defines poverty reduction and support for the MDGs as the common objective of 
European assistance.  
                                                             
14 Interviews in Addis October 2009. 
15 Ibid. 
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With a view to improving donor coordination, Ethiopia has been selected as a pioneer 
also for implementing the Code of Conduct on Division of Labour. The EC has taken 
the lead; yet the European system relies on coordination only. The European 
Commission cannot take hierarchical decisions and needs to carefully balance member 
states‟ interests and existing structures with the need for more coherence. For the time 
being, European donors have been fairly reluctant to phase out of sectors or to channel 
their assistance through other EU member states‟ structures. While the Code of Conduct 
stresses that division of labour should be a „recipient-led‟ process, the Ethiopian 
government has not taken a very active stance. Some highlight that the government has 
withdrawn from the process when its initial suggestions were not taken into account by 
donors. Others suggest that the government is reluctant to take a more active position, 
since the fragmentation of the donor system allows the government to better control its 
policy agenda vis-à-vis donors.16 
Bureaucratic interests and structures on the European side as well as divergences between 
the EU and the Ethiopian government about the direction of reforms constitute the 
major hurdles to implement the reform agenda. A survey conducted among European 
representatives indicates that the incompatibility of administrative aid structures, 
bureaucratic interests and political will in European capitals challenges the 
implementation of division of labour. Different donor budgetary cycles for instance 
impede better coordination and joint planning. Some representatives from EU member 
states further highlight that they receive mixed signals from headquarters that ask for 
implementing the aid effectiveness agenda but pressure at the same time to maintain the 
visibility of their country as a donor. 17  Due to the level of needs, the perceived 
development orientation of the government and good track records in implementing 
assistance, Ethiopia is a donor darling: everybody wants to be present on the ground. 
Better coordination and the introduction of new aid instruments is further hampered by 
diverging views between donors and the government on the direction of reforms. The 
most visible clash between European donors and the government emerged during the 
crisis following the general elections in Ethiopia in May 2005. Before the election, the EC 
and some EU member states provided direct budgetary support. In light of the 
government‟s crackdown on opposition parties after the elections, donors decided to 
suspend direct budgetary support, also to pressure the Ethiopian government to reconcile 
with the opposition. However, donors decided not to reduce funds but to channel them 
through other programmes with stricter monitoring and earmarking procedures attached, 
notably the Protection of Basic Services (PBS). Some observers argue that this was 
indeed „a more sophisticated response than blunt conditionality of withholding aid‟ 
                                                             
16 Interviews in Ethiopia in October 2009 and November 2010; unpublished survey conducted among 
European donors at the end of 2008 to assess progress made with regard to Division of Labour.  
17 Ibid. 
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(Borchgrevink 2008: 212), providing the basis to remain engaged with the government 
and paving the way for a less fragmented policy dialogue (see also Furtado / Smith 2009). 
Some European NGOs, instead, have been vocally criticising that multi-donor 
programmes such as the PBS ultimately strengthen the ruling elite to the detriment of 
democratic reforms (Human Rights Watch 2010). 
 
FORGING A NEW PARTNERSHIP? 
As part of the reform process, the EU and other donors have also sought to strengthen 
policy and political dialogue with the government. Political and policy dialogues 
constitute a key entry point for European cooperation with the Ethiopian government. 
Dialogue mechanisms do not only seek to improve the coordination among donors to 
reduce the administrative burden for the Ethiopian government of engaging with a large 
number of donors. They shall also strengthen an agreement between donors and the 
government about reform priorities and the direction of reforms in different policy fields. 
Some observers argue that while policy dialogues contribute to improving the 
coordination among traditional donors, they still put considerable stress on the 
government‟s capacities. Areas where a consensus between the Ethiopian government 
and Western donors exist, these cooperation structures work effectively. In areas of clear 
disagreements between Western donors and the government, cooperation in turn is also 
difficult and in some policy fields no policy dialogue takes place (Furtado / Smith 2009; 
interviews Addis 2009). Political dialogue that the EU and the Ethiopian government 
have established under the Cotonou Agreement has provided mixed results. In this 
dialogue, the EU seeks to discuss on democratic reforms in Ethiopia as well as 
international issues. Before the 2005 elections, political dialogue included governance 
issues and “was of a good, steadily improving quality” (Ethiopia and European 
Community 2008: 37). In the aftermath of the crisis, the EU sought to use dialogue as a 
channel for engagement and to foster debates on democratic reforms, for instance in 
2009 when the Ethiopian government passed a civil society law that was widely criticised 
for reducing political space for civil society organisations working on governance issues. 
Endeavours to engage with the government on governance issues, however, met strong 
reluctance on the side of Ethiopian authorities. 
Overall, the EU has made considerable efforts over the last years to improve the quality 
of its assistance to Ethiopia and to engage as a more coherent actor in development. At 
the same time, the case of Ethiopia highlights how bureaucratic structures and interests 
inherent in the aid system affect the reform agenda. European cooperation with Ethiopia 
also reveals some of the tensions in European development policy between promoting 
„ownership‟ and partnership on the one hand and governance reforms on the other. 
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3.2. CHINA: A COMPREHENSIVE PARTNER IN THE MAKING 
Chinese cooperation with Ethiopia and the dynamics in Sino-Ethiopian relations diverge 
substantially from EU-Ethiopia relations. Similar to the EU, for China Ethiopia is one of 
the most important partners in Africa. Yet, in contrast to the EU, development aid is not 
the main ingredient in Sino-Ethiopian relations. Chinese cooperation with Ethiopia is 
instead increasingly made of other official flows, trade, investments and political 
cooperation. For China, Ethiopia thereby emerges as a unique political ally in Africa as 
well as a promising economic partner. 
Since China does not calculate its aid and other official flows along the OECD DAC 
standards and does not publish aggregated data on its official flows to Ethiopia, the 
volume of Chinese assistance to Ethiopia is difficult to assess. In the 1990s, economic 
cooperation mainly consisted of few aid projects. 18  Since the establishment of the 
FOCAC framework in 2000 and particularly since 2005, Chinese official flows to 
Ethiopia have increased considerably. The Chinese Ambassador to Ethiopia highlights 
that Ethiopia is the only country that has received support from all eight FOCAC policy 
measures (Gu 2008), indicating Ethiopia‟s importance for China‟s Africa policy. Most of 
the projects and technical assistance provided under the FOCAC framework – such as 
rural schools, a Malaria Prevention Centre, a Technical and Vocational Training Centre, 
an Agriculture Demonstration Centre or scholarships – would be classified as 
development aid under the OECD DAC definition. However, more important in terms 
of volume are loans that are provided with varying degrees of concessionality. Ethiopia 
has received a concessional loan for an Expressway from Addis to Dukem.19 In addition, 
the Export Import (EXIM) bank and increasingly also other policy banks such as the 
China Development Bank provide preferential and commercial loans. Although 
preferential and commercial loans are provided below market rates, they would not be 
counted as aid in the OECD definition.20 Preferential and commercial loans are allocated 
for large scale productive projects, e.g. in hydro power or the purchase of vessels for 
Ethiopia shipping lines. Preferential and commercial loans have been provided only for 
about three years.21 In contrast to widespread assumptions that Chinese financial flows 
are mostly directed to resources rich countries like Angola or Sudan, Ethiopia has 
become one of the largest recipients of credit lines from the Chinese EXIM bank in 
Africa.22 
                                                             
18 The aid data project lists a Sewing Machine Factory, a wells and water supply project and a water 
conservation project (Hawkins et al 2010). At the beginning of the 2000s China has further started to 
support road construction in Addis, e.g. the ring road. 
19 Interviews in Addis in October 2009 and November 2010. 
20 Give information on conditions. The OECD DAC would not count these loans as ODA because they 
are primarily directed at supporting Chinese exports and their degree of concessionality is too low. 
21 Interviews in Addis October 2009 and November 2010. 
22 Interviews in Beijing March 2011. 
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Apart from an increase in Chinese assistance and official flows, Sino-Ethiopian trade and 
Chinese direct investments to Ethiopia developed very dynamically during the last few 
years. Similar to the EU, for China trade with Ethiopia is marginal compared to trade 
with other African (resource rich) countries, e.g. Angola. Still remarkable is the substantial 
growth in trade volumes since 2000. In 2009, China has been the second largest trading 
partner for Ethiopia almost equal to the EU as a whole and the largest single import and 
export partner (EIU 2011). Similar to the EU, Ethiopia has a large deficit in trade with 
China.23 As for other least developed countries, China grants Ethiopia duty and quota 
free exports for about 440 products (Thakur 2009). During the past five years, Chinese 
companies have been the third largest foreign investors to Ethiopia, after Saudi Arabia 
and India and ahead of Sudan and Turkey. Chinese companies engage mainly in 
manufacturing and Chinese investments are spread across a wide number and range of 
projects (Geda / Meskel 2009; EEA 2009; EIU 2011) A special economic zone that has 
been established outside Addis is currently under construction and likely to attract more 
Chinese (and other) investments. Also the China Africa Development Fund, an equity 
fund managed by the China Development Bank, started supporting Chinese investment 
projects in Ethiopia and opened its first Africa office in Addis in 2010. 
The intensification of Sino-Ethiopian relations and the considerable volume of Chinese 
official flows to Ethiopia compared to other African states needs to be analysed in the 
context of China‟s overall engagement on the African continent. The Ethiopian 
government has been one of the driving forces on the African side in setting up the 
FOCAC meeting. The Ethiopian Ambassador in Beijing has been actively engaged in the 
creation of the FOCAC framework24 and the second meeting took place in Addis in 
2003. As a host of African regional organisations and a vocal actor on the international 
scene, Ethiopia is seen by Chinese officials as an important partner in regional and 
international debates. 25 In 2007, for instance, Ethiopia – together with other African 
countries – prevented a resolution censoring Chinese human rights records at the UN 
Human Rights Commission. In 2006, the Ethiopian parliament issued a resolution to 
support China‟s Anti-Secession Law 26  (Thakur 2009). Similar to European donors, 
Chinese officials see Ethiopia as a relative pole of stability in the region. Ethiopia is 
perceived as having comparatively well developed bureaucratic structures and a 
government with a clear development vision. Chinese officials therefore highlight 
Ethiopia‟s economic potential in the medium and long term.27 From the perspective of 
                                                             
23 For an analysis of Sino-Ethiopia trade relations see also (EEA 2009). 
24 Interviews in Addis in October 2009 and Beijing in July 2010. 
25 Ibid. 
26 The Anti-Secession Law provides China with the legal basis to take military action against Taiwan in the 
case of unilateral declaration of independence from China. The law was strongly criticised internationally 
when it was passed by the Chinese People‟s Congress early 2006. 
27 Interviews in Addis in October 2009 and Beijing in July 2010. 
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Chinese provincially and centrally stateowned construction companies, Ethiopia is an 
important – predominantly Western donor financed – market in the region.28 Chinese 
SMEs and private companies that invest in Ethiopia see the country as a promising 
market and as a „launch pad‟ for their engagement in the whole region.29 
 
SETTING UP NEW INSTRUMENTS AND STRUCTURES FOR COOPERATION 
Sino-Ethiopian institutions for cooperation and mechanisms to mange the increasing 
interdependence are in a process of building up. Compared to the EU and other 
traditional donors, Sino-Ethiopian cooperation is not only more loosely institutionalised, 
also channels for cooperation and overall approaches diverge. Similar to the EU and 
other donors, the Chinese and Ethiopian government have set up a joint commission 
composed of the Ethiopian Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and 
representatives from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. This commission serves as a 
forum to discuss on general issues regarding trade and investments and to deal with 
possible tensions related to Chinese projects (Burke et al 2007; interviews China July 
2010). Concrete negotiations on large scale loans or loan framework agreements take 
place on a case by case basis, often at the highest political level.30  
In contrast to the EU and other Western donors, the Chinese government is obviously 
not pushing for debates on democratic reforms in Ethiopia. Beyond government-to-
government contacts and in contrast to European cooperation with Ethiopia, relations 
between China and Ethiopia‟s ruling parties function as an important additional channel 
to strengthen bilateral relations (Hackenesch 2011). For the EPRDF, the Ethiopian ruling 
party coalition, the Chinese Communist Party is the most important international partner. 
Party-to-party meetings also provide a channel to discuss on development experiences, 
the role of the party in the state or party succession strategies. It is important to note that 
both sides have mutual interests in these discussions.31  
While cooperation has been dominated by high level exchange for some time, the 
Chinese government actively seeks to foster broader contacts. Since 2006 about 200 
officials from Ethiopian regional and national administrations have been travelling to 
China every year for ten days up to one month.32 Discussions with Ethiopian participants 
and Chinese officials indicate that this type of visit not only helps to transfer general 
                                                             
28 During the last decade, state-owned companies from China have been winning a large number of 
international bids in road construction, financed for instance by the World Bank or by via sector budget 
support by the European Union (interviews in Addis, October 2009 and November 2010). 
29 Interviews Beijing July 2010 and in Addis November 2010. For an analysis of Chinese foreign direct 
investments in Ethiopia see also EEA (2009) and Geda and Meskel (2009). 
30 Interviews in Addis, October 2009 and November 2010. 
31 Interviews in Beijing July 2010 and Addis November 2010. 
32 Interview Chinese Embassy Addis November 2010. 
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knowledge about China and to create a supportive environment for Sino-Ethiopian 
relations. „Showing‟ how China developed and the results of China‟s opening up policy 
certainly also has an impact on Ethiopian views on reform policies.33 
 
FOSTERING MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS? 
In contrast to some African countries where Chinese engagement is controversially 
discussed,34 in Ethiopia major conflicts or controversial debates resulting from the direct 
impact of Chinese investments, trade or financial assistance have faintly come up. 
However, with increasing interdependence a growing number of actors places demands 
on the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce. While 
Ethiopian and international actors ask for better regulation of Chinese companies, 
Chinese companies are instead concerned with the business environment in Ethiopia. 
Anecdotic evidence suggests for instance that growing criticism from local and 
international NGOs about Chinese financing for controversial large scale hydro power 
projects35  induces Chinese officials to carefully assess support for further projects.36 No 
different from Western companies, Chinese companies in Ethiopia on their turn have 
been complaining about the rigid currency policy of the Ethiopian government or about 
quality controls of Chinese exports to Ethiopia that are perceived to be more restrictive 
than for products from other countries.37 With Chinese increasing financial support, the 
Ethiopian government‟s expectations vis-à-vis China are also rising.38 
Driven by a rapid intensification in trade, investments, aid and political cooperation, 
Sino-Ethiopian relations are currently probably in their „honey moon‟. From a Chinese 
perspective, relations with Ethiopia appear as a highly successful example for Chinese 
increasing engagement in Africa since the first FOCAC meeting in 2000. With the 
strengthening of bilateral relations China‟s direct impact in Ethiopia raises quickly. Also 
                                                             
33 Interviews with representatives from different institutions who have participated in these training 
courses, Addis November 2010 
34 In Zambia, for instance, Chinese engagement was one of the controversial issues during the presidential 
election campaign in 2006 and 2011. Engagement in the copper belt has lately been discussed again in the 
media. 
35 International Rivers has been one of the most active in monitoring the development of the hydro power 
sector in Ethiopia. In 2010 Dongfang Electric Corporation and the Chinese Bank ICBC signed agreements 
with Ethiopian government that they would provide support for this project. For more information refer to 
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/emplayersnews/64755, or 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/africa/ethiopia/gibe-3-dam-ethiopia/letter-dongfang-electric-
corporation-and-gibe-3-project, last access June 2011 
36 Interviews in Addis, October 2009 and November 2010 
37 Interviews in Beijing in July 2010 and Addis November 2010. 
38 Chinese interviewees point to growing expectations on the side of the Ethiopian government that China 
supports large infrastructure investments foreseen in Ethiopia‟s development strategy such as the railway or 
further hydro power projects. 
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asymmetries in a relationship that has so far been seen from both sides as one of equals 
are growing rapidly, potentially leading to more tensions in the future. Chinese 
engagement relies on the assumption that Ethiopia‟s economic development will be a 
success story. If benefits from recent investments, e.g. in hydropower, 
telecommunications or the Special Economic Zone, are not commercially viable, China 
will have difficulties to sustain a comprehensive partnership. 
 
3.3. CHINA IN ETHIOPIA: WHAT IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY? 
Starting from a low basis at the beginning of the new century, Chinese official flows, 
trade and investments to Ethiopia have been growing tremendously in recent years. 
Despite analytical difficulties to directly compare European and Chinese official flows – 
as Chinese aid is mixed with other forms of official flows and country-specific data is 
thus difficult to obtain (Grimm 2011) – one can argue that both China and Europe have 
become equally important economic partners for Ethiopia. While African actors are 
discussing the implications for African development, this also raises questions for 
European donors with regard to the consequences of Chinese engagement for European 
development policy. 
Chinese development finance first of all appears to be largely complementary to 
European aid. China provides the bulk of its assistance to policy fields where the EU is 
less active or not engaging at all, e.g. telecommunication or energy. China thereby 
supports policy fields that have received less attention by European and other traditional 
donors because they require large scale financing or because of diverging priorities 
between European donors and the Ethiopian government. In policy fields where 
European donors as well as China are engaging, parallel structures are emerging. In 
transport, for instance, the European Commission provides sector budget support, 
whereas China supports single large scale projects such as the expressway from Addis to 
Dukem. Since Ethiopian administrative capacities and sector development strategies are 
comparatively strong and well developed, these parallel structures do not represent a 
particular challenge for Ethiopia as of now. In education and health, Chinese assistance is 
still small compared to European aid. Challenges for donor coordination in these policy 
fields result from the fragmentation of the traditional donor system rather than Chinese 
assistance. Overall, Chinese engagement strengthens the ability of the Ethiopian 
government to implement its development strategy and to do this more independently 
from European and other donors‟ preferences. 
Until recently there has been limited direct contact between European and Chinese 
officials. Also European donors‟ interest and knowledge on Sino-Ethiopian relations has 
been limited. This can be explained by the fact that Chinese development finance, trade 
and investments have been growing only during the last few years. At the same time, the 
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Ethiopian government has engaged with China and European donors on separate terms. 
China has rarely taken part in traditional donor coordination rounds and donor meetings 
with the government, providing limited direct points of contact between 
Europeandonors and China. In addition, China partly cooperates with Ethiopia through 
different channels than the EU, e.g. party to party relations. European interest in Sino-
Ethiopian cooperation has probably also been limited, since European donors have been 
busy reforming their development policy, leaving limited room to engage with other 
actors beyond the traditional donor system. 
Yet, Chinese presence is more and more felt by European donors, not least because the 
Ethiopian government increasingly uses its cooperation with China and other emerging 
economies as an explicit bargaining chip in negotiations with European donors (and vice 
versa). This shift in strategy has become obvious last year when the Ethiopian 
government presented its development strategy to international partners. For the first 
time representatives from China, India, Brazil and Russia have been invited alongside 
traditional donors. During the meeting, the Chinese Ambassador has not only provided 
rhetorical support for the Ethiopian government against criticism from traditional 
donors.39 China has also committed to further increase its financial support for Ethiopia‟s 
development strategy. 
For European donors this more direct “confrontation” with China may increase the 
pressure to live up to its reform commitments and reduce the fragmentation of the 
European aid system. With decreasing relative weight as aid providers, European donors 
will need to make more efforts to remain attractive partners for the Ethiopian 
government. While the Ethiopian government seeks to maximise support for its 
development from various sources, the fragmentation of the European donor system and 
the „projectitis‟ of some European donors is increasingly felt as an administrative burden. 
As one government official points out: “A clear advantage of China is that they support 
large scale projects in contrast to some European donors who come with many tiny 
programmes” (interview in Addis November 2010). 
Chinese cooperation with Ethiopia may further have implications for European donors 
to establish themselves as partners to discuss about political and economic reforms with 
the Ethiopian government. Ethiopian elites have been interested in Chinese development 
path for some time. However, China‟s growing weight in international relations and 
strengthened contact with Ethiopian government and party officials further increase the 
attractiveness of China as a role model. While exchange on political and economic 
reforms between China and Ethiopia takes place in different fora, e.g. via party to party 
relations or exchange between government officials, this cooperation is largely demand 
driven. Discussions on political reforms between European donors and the Ethiopian 
                                                             
39 Interviews in Addis in November 2010. 
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government instead are strongly driven by the EU. If European donors aim at setting up 
a comprehensive political dialogue on governance reforms, European donors will need to 
better explain this request in light of the presence of alternative cooperation partners 
such as China. In this regard the EU will also have to clarify how important these values 
are considered as a basis for cooperation. Beneath European rhetoric and attempts to 
support democratic reforms through political dialogue or direct assistance, European 
concrete policies towards Ethiopia reveal the thin layer of this value in EU development 
policy and the divergence in approaches among European donors. To give one example: 
only few months after substantial disagreements between European donors and the 
Ethiopian government over the conduct of the parliamentary elections in 2010,40 the 
British Department for International Development (DfID) has announced to double 
assistance to Ethiopia by 2015. While this decision arguably has been influenced by a 
number of factors,41 it also shows the attractiveness of a developmental state for aid 
bureaucracies regardless of the democratic foundations of this state. With its different 
rhetoric and different approach to cooperation, Chinese presence in Ethiopia sheds more 
light on these contradictions in European development policy. 
Some European donors have started to reach out to foster trilateral dialogue and 
cooperation with Chinese and Ethiopian actors; yet with limited results.42 The Ethiopian 
government on its part has been reluctant to respond to requests by European donors, 
seeking instead to engaging China and traditional donors on separate terms, while 
increasing its leverage vis-à-vis both. For the Chinese Ministry of Commerce or the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in turn, interest in cooperating with European donors is low. 
On the European side, initiatives to foster trilateral dialogue and cooperation have been 
pushed mainly by European capitals and notably by those parts of the aid bureaucracy 
working on China rather than on Africa, raising questions about European motives for 
trilateral cooperation (Grimm / Hackenesch 2012). Since knowledge in European 
development policy circles about the actors and decision-making processes in Chinese 
policies towards Africa is still limited, it is further difficult for European donors to 
identify relevant actors and potential fields for cooperation. While the EU has been 
decentralising parts of its programming process to Ethiopia, on the Chinese side key 
                                                             
40 The EU has sent an election observer mission to monitor the elections in 2010. The mission was not 
allowed to present its final report in Ethiopia. http://www.eueom.eu/files/pressreleases/english/press-
release-08112010_en.pdf, last access June 2011. 
41 The UK is one of the few major European donors increasing its assistance even in light of the economic 
crisis. Higher aid budget, however, also need to be disbursed. In times when aid to emerging economies 
such as India or China is more difficult to justify vis-à-vis European tax payers, Ethiopia appears probably 
as a natural target for British aid. 
42 The German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) for instance has started to provide some assistance 
for the Chinese Technical and Vocational Training Centre. 
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decisions are still taken in Beijing and trilateral cooperation would have to be approved in 
Beijing (Grimm 2011b). 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
China‟s increasing role in Ethiopia – and Africa more largely – comes at a time of 
increasing disenchantment with Europe on the Africa side. The EU is in a critical stage in 
reforming its development policy. Against the background of the international aid 
effectiveness agenda, the EU has developed a comprehensive policy framework that 
provides the EU with the institutional basis to engage as a more coherent actor in 
development. Yet, much remains to be done to put this policy framework into practice. 
Instead, the EU for the time being continues to be a highly fragmented donor system in 
which EU member states define their aid policies bilaterally rather than as part of a 
European system and in which new aid instruments and practices have been layered on 
top of rather than replaced the previous system. 
In the midst of this reform process, China‟s presence exerts considerable competitive 
pressure on the European aid regime in general and European development policy to 
individual African countries such as Ethiopia in particular. Although some have argued 
that the emergence of China and other new actors will further contribute to the 
fragmentation of the aid system, the case of Ethiopia shows that development finance 
from the EU and China are largely complementary. Yet, Chinese and European 
perspectives are diverging on how development works, how aid should be provided and 
how aid should link to other forms of cooperation; this is challenging European 
approaches to cooperation. In countries like Ethiopia where China already constitutes an 
actor at eye-level with the EU, European donors will need to make more efforts to 
remain their attractiveness as partners. A more truly European approach will be vital in 
this regard. On the Chinese side, reforms in the aid system and reforms in its Africa 
policy more generally are increasingly influenced by discussions within the international 
aid system. Yet, the international aid system in its current configuration provides no 
incentives for China to integrate and only limited incentives for the Ethiopian 
government to push for more Chinese participation. Rather, China is regarded as an 
alternative to Western partners.  
Given the complementarity of both actors, it is in fact a risky strategy to alienate one or 
the other partner in a situation of (still) high aid dependency. The question for the 
Ethiopian government is apparently not an either-or question, but one about the clever 
combination of various sources of development funding. The Ethiopian government will 
have to balance it traditional partners and China, catering predominantly for its own, 
Ethiopian development interests in this process. In this situation of (perceived) 
competition, the EU faces a triple challenge: it needs to reform its own system; it needs 
to put its weight into the balance to push for further reforms within the international aid 
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system; and it needs to reach out to engage with a diversifying range of Chinese actors 
and establish structures for communication with actors beyond the aid system. In the 
European development policy community Chinese engagement is still too often 
perceived as a challenge rather than an opportunity; African governments often express 
reservations about being tutored and being pushed into choices that they do not see as in 
African development interests. If aid is about development in the first place, future policy 
strategies will have to develop more pro-active strategies how aid can be designed to 
maximise the opportunities that arise for developing countries with other types of 
development  
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